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1. Introduction 
The number of part-time jobs has increased slightly but continuously in most advanced 
economies over the last decades. The ratio of total employment of part-time workers in the OECD 
increased from 13.9% in 1988 to 15.7% in 2012. Driving this type of employment are demand 
factors, such as the increasing importance of the service sector and fixed costs per employee, and 
supply factors, like increasing women’s labour participation (Euwals and Hogerbrugge, 2006 and 
Montgomery, 1988). Furthermore, many governments have considered part-time jobs as a response 
to economic crisis, given that they offer greater flexibility to firms regarding the use of their labour 
force while at the same time facilitating job creation. In particular, after the crisis in the 1970s, some 
countries had a high share of part-time jobs, like Denmark (21.1%), Canada (16.4%), the 
Netherlands (19.7%), United Kingdom (20.1%), and United States (14.7%)—a trend that continued 
in the subsequent years. More currently (2013 data), part-time employment is prevalent in the 
Netherlands (39.9%), followed by Switzerland (25.4%), Ireland (25.1%), Australia (24.2%), United 
Kingdom (24.0%), Germany (22.8%), New Zealand (20.6%), Denmark (19.9%), Belgium (19.4%), 
and Austria (19.3%). 
Anglo-Saxon countries and some Scandinavian and Central European countries, with 
different social and labour models, rank highest in part-time employment, and all of them have high 
rates of female labour force participation. On the contrary, part-time employment has advanced less 
in Mediterranean countries, particularly in Portugal (7.2%) and Greece (12.1%), with lower rates of 
female activity. In Central and Eastern European countries, part-time jobs are only starting to 
develop after the transition to a market economy, with values between 4.4% (Hungary and Czech 
Republic) and 7.6% (Estonia). 
In the Spanish case, part-time employment increased slightly, from 4.2% in 1987 to 6.8% in 
1995, but it clearly accelerated over the next two decades, up to 10.8%, and even more during the 
last crisis, up to 15.7% in 2013. This is a moderate figure, similar to the OECD average (15.4%) but 
lower than the EU (19.6%) and the Eurozone (21.5%) averages. On one hand, the lower presence 
of part-time jobs is likely because its regulation has not been clear until very recently (Muñoz de 
Bustillo et al, 2008 and Fernández-Kranz and Rrodríguez-Planas, 2010). On the other hand, firms 
achieve flexibility mainly through fixed-term contracts (24.0% in 2014, but 31.6% in 2007). A 
prominent characteristic of part-time employment in Spain, different from the vast majority of 
countries, is that it is mainly involuntary (62%). 
Spain’s increasing trend of part-time employment, which will probably continue in the 
future, is propelled by the legal change approved in late 2013 allowing more flexibility in the number 
of working hours. The involuntary nature of part-time employment, together with the fact that it 
represents 26% of total female employment, clearly justifies interest in analysing part-time jobs in 
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Spain. Additionally, although economic theory gives reasons to expect a wage penalisation for part-
time employees, research on the Spanish case is scarce and inconclusive—two features that justify 
interest in advancing in knowledge of the consequences of part-time employment for wages. Finally, 
international literature on part-time employment does not include studies from the regional 
perspective on the phenomenon (as far as we know). The Spanish case is especially attractive from 
this perspective. Regional differences in part-time employment are important (Table 3). For 
instance, among men, the percentage of part-time workers in the Canary Islands doubles that of 
Asturias, while among women, Navarra is ahead of Madrid by eleven points. In general, we observe 
more part-time workers in tourist areas in the South and along the Mediterranean coast, and in the 
islands in the case of men. On the other hand, observed wage differences between part-time and 
full-time workers are widely dissimilar at the regional level; aggregated values are negative for both 
genders, and bigger among women, but regional differences are very important, especially for men. 
Additionally, Spain is a highly decentralised state (second in the EU after Denmark), and it is the 
country where regional governments manage a greater percentage of public expenditures, having 
wide competencies in active labour market policies. Hence, a regional analysis is particularly 
interesting in the Spanish case. 
In this paper, we analyse wage penalisation for part-time workers in the Spanish labour 
market, distinguishing among men and women. One of the novelties of our analysis is that it does 
not focus solely on differences in terms of average wages, but it is extended to wage differences 
observed along the wage distribution, an aspect that, to our knowledge, has not been examined in 
previous studies. Second, wage differences by working time duration and for all regions (and both 
genders) are quantified, and we approximate the regional factors that explain the regional 
differences observed. Again, note that it is an approximation for which there are few precedents in 
the literature. 
The database used in the empirical analysis is the Encuesta de Estructura Salarial (Survey of 
Earnings Structure; hereafter, SES). It is a survey designed specifically to determine the 
characteristics of the wage distribution in the Spanish labour market, making it particularly 
appropriate for the analysis of wage differentials, e.g., differentials associated with the type of 
working time. One of the most remarkable features of SES is that it offers abundant information 
about the characteristics of employees and their jobs, allowing for the introduction of firm fixed 
effects in the econometric estimations when including observations for various employees in every 
firm (that is, matched employer-employee microdata). Moreover, data provided by firms does not 
suffer from the limitations, widely outlined in literature, of surveys addressed to households, where 
the information about wages and working time suffers from measurement error. Although the SES 
does not give information about the family setting of the worker, and it is impossible to make any 
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corrections of the potential sample self-selection with the usual techniques, this limitation is minor 
when we consider that in Spain a minority of part-time workers are voluntary. 
The structure of the article is as follows. In the second section we review the literature about 
wage differences between part-time and full-time employees. In the third section, we present the 
database used in the study. In the fourth section we describe the econometric methodologies used 
in the empirical analysis. In the fifth section, we present the empirical evidence obtained, and, 
finally, the paper ends with the main conclusions. 
 
2. Literature review 
Part-time employment is seen in the majority of the literature as another component of the 
secondary labour market that grants flexibility while providing employment for less qualified 
persons. It is closely linked to the labour market segment (students or young adults, women limited 
by familial responsibilities, advanced age adults, those approaching retirement or lacking in 
productive capacity, among others). This conception is facilitated by the characteristics usually 
associated to part-time jobs, like lower wages, high temporality (and absence of firing costs), and—
in the case of many countries or the modality of partial employment—fewer worker rights, like paid 
holidays or remuneration for medical leave. Coherent with this view, the literature has analysed the 
differences between part-time and full-time employment, confirming that part-time employees have 
reduced access to social security benefits (Houseman and Matchiko, 1998), fewer labour progress 
opportunities (Tilly, 1990; Russo and Hassik, 2008), smaller pensions (Gimm and Arber, 1998; 
O'Connell and Gash, 2003), less labour stability (Muñoz Bustillo et. al., 2008; Fernández-Franz et. 
al., 2014), and a lower unionisation rate (Belous, 1988). 
Despite all these differences between part-time and full-time employment, the issue that has 
garnered the attention of researchers is the study of wage differences. Table 1 presents a list of 
studies on the topic carried out in the last decade. The main conclusions that can be obtained from 
these studies are the following: 
 
a) There is a negative wage difference (in terms of hourly wage) for part-time employees when 
compared to full-time employees. 
b) Part of this raw wage gap is explained by differences in the characteristics between both 
groups of workers, whether observable or unobservable. 
c) The characteristics of the job and the firm contribute to explaining the wage differential, 
given that many part-time workers are engaged in sectors, firms, and low-salary occupations 
(Hirsch, 2005, among others). 
4
   
d) Despite adding multiple controls, an unexplained part of the wage differential persists, which 
is the wage penalty associated with working part-time. The wage penalty can be null for 
young people who accede to their first job (Russo and Hassik, 2008), while there is abundant 
evidence that the differential increases with age and especially with years worked in part-time 
positions (Wolf, 2014). Wage increase over time is inferior for part-time workers 
(Fernández-Kranz and Rodríguez-Planas, 2011). 
e) While analyses for both genders are abundant and agree that wage penalty is usually greater 
for women than for men, studies that make disaggregated estimations are scarce. Literature 
has advanced in disaggregating by levels of qualification, concluding that the wage penalty is 
greater for the most qualified workers, given that they suffer more from the effects of 
occupational degradation (Connolly and Gregory, 2009), although quantile regressions have 
not been carried out to estimate the penalty along the wage distribution. There is also 
empirical evidence by labour market segment finding that the wage penalty happens entirely 
due to the concentration of part-time employments in the secondary segment (O'Connell 
and Gash, 2003). 
f) Studies with regional disaggregation have not been conducted. Only two studies analyse a 
territorial level lower than the national level. Harris (1993) studies the issue for women in 
Northern Ireland, finding a penalty of 19%—a number higher than that which other authors 
have found for the whole of the United Kingdom. Wolf (2014) distinguishes between West 
and East Germany, obtaining practically identical results, which is not a surprise given the 
little regional detail considered. 
 
Analysing the estimated wage penalty, we observe that the magnitude is unequal among 
countries and also among studies in the same country. However, in countries like Australia and 
South Africa, a positive wage bonus for part-time workers is observed1. The variety of results 
among countries seems to respond to institutional differences: the wage penalty is systematically 
higher in Anglo-Saxon countries, representatives of a liberal model, than in Central European 
countries and, especially, in Nordic countries, characterised by labour markets that are more 
regulated and that show higher union and social agreement practices.  
For instance, Bardasi and Gornick (2008) observe higher wage penalties for part-time 
women in the US, UK, Canada, and Italy than in Germany and, especially, Sweden, where they did 
                                                 
1 This result is explained by the theory of compensatory wages. Posel and Muller (2007) attributes the existence of such 
wage premiums in South Africa to the fact that part-time workers do not usually have labour stability or access to 
unemployment benefits or a retirement pension; furthermore, they benefit from minimal sectorial wages that are high 
for part-time work. Boot and Wood (2008) argue that high marginal tax rates that plague secondary familial incomes in 
Australia have to be compensated by the companies to be able to have enough part-time job supply. Additionally, 
contract part-time workers are compensated with wage premiums, although the latter has only been empirically 
demonstrated for women. Rodgers (2004) does not observe a premium or a penalty in Australia. 
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not find any penalty. Pissarides et al. (2005) obtain similar results using data from the European 
Community Household Panel Survey (ECHP), as in the 15 countries they analyse, the highest wage 
penalty is for women is in the UK and Ireland. In the case of men, it is UK and Ireland plus 
Denmark2. Although the numbers of Pissarides et al. refer to the 1980s, Hu and Tijdens (2003) also 
find a much greater wage penalty in the UK than in the Netherlands. O'Dorchai et al. (2007), 
working just with men, also estimate a high penalty in Ireland and the UK, plus Italy, while it is non-
existent in Denmark. It seems, then, that the same forces that limit global wage inequality—whether 
it is government regulations or the presence of labour institutions—restrain the wage gap and the 
wage penalty for part-time workers. 
In addition to differences among countries, there are also different estimations for the same 
country, an aspect that can be appreciated in the case of the UK, because we have various studies 
separated by relatively few years3. Disparity of results seems to depend on the database used, the 
methodology of estimation, and on the controls included in the wage equations. Penalisation for 
British males varies between 15 points (O’Dorchai et al., 2007 with the WSS) and 20 points 
(Pissarides et. al., 2005). Hu and Tijdens (2003) estimate a penalty of 29 points combined for both 
genders with the same data as Pissarides et al. (2005).  
Additional studies for women have found wage penalties that vary between 32 and 0 points. 
Bardasi and Gornick (2008), with data from the Luxemburg Income Study (LIS) and controlling for 
self-selection with a multinomial logit, estimate a pay penalty of 15 points, which disappears when 
sector and occupation controls are introduced. Manning and Petrongolo (2008) obtain similar 
results with data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS). On the contrary, Connolly and Gregory 
(2009) with the New Earnings Survey (NES) panel find a wage decrease of 7% for women who 
reduce their working time without changing occupation, and of 32% if they suffer occupational 
degradation. 
The Spanish economy presents, likewise, very dissimilar results. In a first study about the 
issue, Cebrián et al. (2000) use the first wave of the ECHP carried out in 1994. The authors estimate 
a wage equation including individual controls and introducing dummy variables for part-time female 
workers, obtaining a positive wage premium of 12 logarithmic points for female part-time workers 
and of 30 points for those working less than 15 hours per week. In a later work (Cebrián et al., 
2001), using the ECHP for 1995, they estimate wage equations with individual and job controls 
                                                 
2 The most surprising result from Pissarides et al. (2005) is a noticeable positive wage premium for men and women in 
the Mediterranean countries and for French women, which they attribute to a larger measurement error in the working 
hours in these countries. 
3 This aspect is important, because gross wage difference and wage penalty evolve over time. In particular, since part-
time workers are segmented in jobs and low-wage sectors, their wage gap grows as a result of an increase of global wage 
inequality in the labour market (Manning and Petrongolo, 2008). 
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(including sector and occupation), and they do not obtain any penalisation for part-time women 
workers. 
Pissarides et al. (2005), also working with the ECHP from 1994 to 1999, obtain again a 
positive premium for Spain (6 logarithmic points among men and 9 points among women) after 
controlling for occupation4. Pagán (2007), with the extended sample of the ECHP from 2000, also 
estimates positive wage premiums for both genders, superior for women (14.3 logarithmic points as 
opposed to 6.3 for men), after controlling for occupations and correcting the sample selection with 
an ordered probit with four states. O'Dorchai et al. (2007) use SES microdata from 1995 and, after 
controlling for occupation, estimate a male wage penalty of -6 logarithmic points. 
Using data from the Continuous Sample of Working Histories (MCVL in Spanish) from 
1996 and 2006, Fernández-Kranz and Rodríguez-Planas (2011) obtain for 25 to 25 year-old women 
a wage penalty that varies between -18.7 logarithmic points, controlling for non-observable 
individual heterogeneity, and -11.4 points, controlling for occupations and adding firm fixed effects. 
The latter variable has a bigger effect on the magnitude of the penalty. In more recent work with the 
same database, Fernández-Kranz et al. (2014) estimate that part-time women from 23 to 45 years 
old on permanently contracts have wage penalties of -6.1 logarithmic points and -9.0 points if the 
contract is temporary. 
Accordingly, the magnitude of the wage penalty in Spain appears to oscillate, looking for the 
greatest compatibility possible, from -17.1 logarithmic points in the MCVL and +14.3 points in the 
ECHP, controlling for occupations and correcting the sample selection. In the case of men, the 
variation goes from +6.3 logarithmic points with the ECHPS to -6.0 points with the SES. It seems 
to be absolutely necessary, then, to provide additional evidence about this issue. 
 
3. Data 
This research is based on the microdata of the most recent wave of the SES (2010). The SES 
is designed as independent cross-section databases updated every four years. Currently, there are 
four available waves: 1995, 2002, 2006, and 2010).  The Spanish National Statistics Institute 
conducts this survey, and it is Spain’s sample for the European Structure of Earnings Survey carried out 
in EU member countries in accordance with a harmonised methodology. It is a nationally 
representative survey on firms that covers employees registered in the social security system 
throughout the month of October at establishments of any size belonging to the general scheme of 
the social security system and whose economic activity is framed in sections B to S of the sectoral 
classification NACE 2009. Therefore, it encompasses the bulk of the private sector of the Spanish 
                                                 
4 The authors argue that taking advantage of the panel structure of their data, controlling for the non-observable factors 
with individual fixed effects does not alter the obtained results, although they do not include such results. 
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economy, excluding only specific sectors such as agriculture and domestic service. The survey 
design corresponds to a two-stage sampling of employees working in firms registered in the social 
security system, and one of its most important features is the inclusion of matched employer-
employee microdata (i.e., observations for various employees in each establishment). Another 
feature is that it is a survey specifically designed to determine the characteristics of the wage 
distribution in the Spanish labour market. Finally, it provides information about the region in which 
the establishment is located and, by design, it is also representative at the regional level, allowing for 
regional analysis, which is part of the aim of our research. 
The survey provides detailed information on wages and worker characteristics (nationality, 
gender, age, and education); jobs (tenure, type of contract, and supervisory tasks)5; and firms (sector, 
size, type of collective agreement, and region). Wage information includes various components and 
covers different time references. The wage concept used in this research is the gross hourly wage, 
calculated from the wage corresponding to a representative month (October) divided by the number 
of hours worked in that month. In this calculation, any payment by companies, including 
commissions, bonuses for night work and weekends, as well as overtime work, has been 
incorporated.  
The firm indicates the employee’s status as full- or part-time is indicated in the SES,6 so that the 
dependent variable in the analysis is a dummy variable differentiating between part-time and full-time. 
The analysis is carried out separately for men and women. The explanatory variables considered include 
characteristics of individuals and characteristics of their jobs and firms. The former are controls relating 
to the nationality of the individual (differentiating between natives and immigrants), the level of general 
education (distinguishing three levels: primary, secondary, and tertiary education), and age. The 
characteristics of the job are years of seniority in the current job (including its quadratic form) and type 
of contract (indefinite or fixed-term), while attributes of the firms are sector (12 categories 
corresponding to sections NACE-93), size (four categories), type of collective agreement 
(distinguishing between firm, national sector, and subnational sector agreements), and region of 
location of the firm. 
Observations with missing values on key variables and those for individuals aged less than 
16 years or over 65 years, or with hourly wages less than 2.5 Euros or greater than 200 Euros have 
been filtered. Moreover, firms with fewer than two observations were excluded from the sample in 
                                                 
5 It also includes information on occupation. However, this variable has not been considered in the analysis, given that it 
potentially suffers from endogeneity in relation to the distribution of individuals between full- and part-time jobs, to the 
extent that part-time employment is often limited to low-wage occupations (for details, see Manning and Petrongolo, 
2008). 
6 Specifically, in the case of each worker, the firm has to choose between full-time or part-time in response to the 
following question: ‘4.1 Type of job.’ It is considered part-time if hours worked are less than the normal working day of 
the firm or, in the absence of a normal working day, if they are lower than the maximum legally set (it must be stipulated 
in the contract). 
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order to allow the correct identification of firm fixed effects in the econometric estimates. Finally, 
following most previous studies on the relative wage treatment of part-time workers that limit the 
analysis to private sector employees, observations corresponding to the public sector (i.e., Section 
O, Public administration and defence, compulsory social security) have been removed. The final 
sample is formed by 152,099 observations, which correspond to 89,344 men and 62,755 women. 
 
4. Methodology 
In the empirical analysis, two econometric methodologies have been used to decompose the 
wage differences of full- and part-time workers. This is an extension of the Juhn-Murphy-Pierce 
methodology (Juhn et al., 1991), adapted for use with matched employer-employee data, which 
permits a detailed decomposition of the average wage differential. The second is the methodology 
proposed by Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo (2011), which provides a detailed decomposition of the 
wage differences throughout the wage distribution. Both techniques are described below. 
4.1. Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition 
First, we use an extension of the Juhn et al. (1991) decomposition, as suggested by Blau and 
Kahn (1992), specifically adapted for use with matched employer-employee data. This technique 
departs from the estimation of the following semi-logarithmic wage equation: 
jijiij aεβXw                     (1) 
wherein wij is the natural log of hourly wage of individual i in workplace j; Xi is a vector of controls 
including individuals’ characteristics and those of their jobs and the companies employing them;  is 
a vector of parameters to be estimated (including an intercept); ij is a stochastic error term, and aj is 
an error component corresponding to workplace j and invariant for all individuals working in the 
same workplace.  
Following the recommendation of Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) and Neumark (1998), we use 
as reference wage structure in the decomposition that corresponding to both groups; equation (1) is 
estimated for the pool of workers (i.e., full- and part-time workers). Identification of workplace 
effects is guaranteed, given that there is more than one observation per workplace in the dataset. 
Since the result of Hausman’s contrast indicates that workplace-specific effects are correlated to the 
rest of the explanatory variables in equation (1), the model is estimated by fixed effects (which is 
equivalent to estimating by ordinary least squares with a set of workplace dummies). Relying on the 
properties of the ordinary least squares estimator, after the estimation of equation (1) with the 
pooled data and having obtained the values of 
Aβˆ , σA and ηA, the average wage of the subgroup of 
workers s (s=full- or part-time workers) can be expressed as:  
                  
ssss Xw   ˆ          where )1,0(~ ,   )1,0(~             (2) 
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where 
sw  stands for the mean natural log of the hourly wage of a given group s; 
sX  is a vector of 
the average of the set of explanatory variables for group s; ˆ  is the vector of coefficients estimated 
with equation (1) and the pooled data; σ is the standard deviation of wage residuals of the pool of 
workers; 
s  is the average standardised residual of group s; η is the standard deviation of workplace 
effects of the pool of full- and part-time workers and 
s  is the average standardised workplace 
effect of group s.  
Using the pooled wage structure as the market price reference in the decomposition, the 
wage gap between part- and full-time workers can be written as follows:  
      ˆ)()(ˆ)( XXXww fpfpfpfp ----                  (3) 
where the subscript p is for part-time workers and f is for full-time workers, and a  prefix denotes 
the average difference between both groups in the subsequent variable.  
In brief, equation (3) provides a decomposition of the part-time/full-time wage gap that 
quantifies the extent to which average wage differences between part-time and full-time workers are 
related to (a) differences in observed characteristics, (b) the influence of unobserved elements, and 
(c) the influence of workplace-related factors. More specifically, the first term on the right-hand side 
of the equation corresponds to the portion of the wage differential attributable to differences in the 
observed characteristics between the two groups )(
fp XX - , valued at market prices ( ˆ ), which 
coincides with the ‘explained’ component of the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. The 
second term measures the influence of unobserved factors in the model. This component comprises 
the effect of unobserved ability, motivation, and discrimination, among others, and corresponds to 
the impact of differences between part- and full-time workers on the average standardised residual 
)( fp  -  multiplied by the money value per unit difference in the standardised residual (σ ), which 
determines the specific wage penalty suffered by the disadvantaged group. Finally, the third term 
estimates the influence of workplace-related factors. This term is taken as a product of the 
difference in the average standardised workplace effect of part-time and full-time workers )(
fp  -
,
 which measures the intensity of part-time workers’ segregation into comparatively low-wage 
workplaces, and the dispersion of wage differentials across workplaces (η), which determines the 
degree of the wage penalty for part-time workers resulting from this segregation. 
 
4.2. Fortin-Lemieux-Firpo decomposition 
Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo (2011) have recently proposed a technique that enhances the 
development of the empirical decompositions of differences between two distributions of a variable. 
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This technique provides a breakdown of the differences between distributions in the value of any 
distributional statistic (as the value of a quantile or an inequality index) based on differences in the 
endowments of characteristics and in their returns. This procedure has considerable advantages 
compared to techniques previously proposed in the literature, which also permit the decomposition 
of differences between distributions based on construction of counterfactual distributions 
(DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux, 1996; Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 1993; Machado and Mata, 2005 and 
Melly, 2005, 2006). Thus, whereas the latter techniques consist of aggregated decompositions, 
which, aside from partial exceptions, provide exclusively the separate effects of characteristics and 
returns, Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo’s methodology provides a detailed decomposition that allows us 
to ascertain the individual contribution of each explanatory variable for both components. 
This methodology is based on the estimation of a regression in which the independent 
variable (the wage) is substituted by a transformation of the same, the recentred influence function (RIF). 
Subsequently, a standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition can be developed for any distributional 
statistic based on the regression results. 
The influence function measures the effect on distributional statistics of small changes in the 
underlying distribution. Thus, for a given distributional statistic of the distribution FW, v(F), this 
function measures the importance of each observation in shaping its value. Fortin, Lemieux, and 
Firpo (2011) suggest using a recentred version of the influence function having added the statistic of 
interest, RIF(W)=v(F)+IF(W), since it has as expected value the actual statistic v(F) (insofar as the 
expectation of the function of influence with respect to distribution of W is, by definition, zero).  
In the case of the quantiles Q  of the unconditioned marginal distribution WF , the function 
of influence, ),( QWIF , is defined as 
)(
}{
)/(




Qf
QWl
QWIF
W

                                              (4) 
where }{l  is an indicator function and Wf is the function of density of the marginal 
distribution of W evaluated in Q . 
Given that the function of recentered influence, ),( QWRIF , is equal to ),(  QWIFQ  , 
then the following is fulfilled: 
)(
}{
)/(




Qf
QWl
QQWRIF
W

                                  (5) 
The RIF function may be computed empirically in the case of the quantiles by means of a 
local inversion following calculation of the dummy variable }{ QWl  (which specifies whether 
the value W is higher or lower than Q ), the estimation of the quantile of the sample Q , and the 
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estimation by means of kernel density functions of the corresponding density function Wf  evaluated 
in Q . 
Following calculation of the RIF function for the quantile, a value is provided for the 
transformed variable for each observation of the sample. Insofar as the effect of the change in 
distribution of an explanatory variable in the quantile may be expressed ceteris paribus, as the average 
partial effect of that variable in the conditioned expectation on its RIF function, and assuming that 
the conditioned expectation of the RIF function may be modelled as a linear function of the 
explanatory variables, these values may be used for estimation by means of ordinary least squares of 
a regression of the RIF variable in a vector of explanatory variables. The estimated coefficients may 
be interpreted as the effect of an increase in the average value of an explanatory variable in the 
distribution quantile.  
The estimated coefficients of that regression may be used for calculation of a standard 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of different quantiles of the distribution. In the development of the 
decomposition, the wage structure of the two groups involved in the comparison has also been used 
as the reference wage structure.  
Consequently, the decomposition takes the following form: 
 )ˆˆ()ˆˆ(ˆ)( *** pQQfQfQpQfpQ XXXX    -                               (6) 
Wherein 
Q
  is the difference in the quantile Q  of the wage distributions of part- and full-
time workers, respectively; pX  and fX  are the average observed characteristics for part- and full-
time workers, and p
Q
ˆ , fQˆ  and 
*ˆ

 Q  are the estimated coefficients following regression of the RIF 
variable of the quantile Q  on the group of explanatory variables for part-time workers, full-time 
workers, and the pool of both groups respectively. The first component of the right-hand side of 
the equation represents the effect on the differential between distributions caused by differences in 
characteristics (or the ‘explained’ component), whereas the second corresponds to the effect of the 
coefficients (or ‘unexplained’ component). As previously referenced, the contribution of each 
explanatory factor can be observed in the decomposition results. 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Descriptive evidence  
Table 2 and figure 1 provide information on the wage differential between part-time and 
full-time workers, measured as the logarithm of the wage per hour and distinguishing between male 
and female workers. A negative value (positive) of the differential corresponds to a wage 
disadvantage (advantage) of part-time workers. Looking at the data, we can conclude that in Spain 
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there is a significant negative average wage differential for part-time workers, although the gap is 
substantially lower in the case of men (-0.104 logarithmic points) than of women (-0.254 logarithmic 
points). The wage differential, however, is not homogeneous along the wage distribution. For 
instance, in the case of male workers the differential decreases notably along the wage distribution 
(until the point to be favourable for part-time workers in the right tail of the distribution), whereas 
in the case of females, the differential increases along the distribution. 
The magnitude of the average wage differential associated with part-time work presents, at 
the same time, high regional heterogeneity (table 3). In the case of female workers, the magnitude of 
the differential exceeds the national average in regions like Andalusia, Extremadura, or Madrid, 
whereas in others like Navarra or The Rioja the differential is notably lower (the maximum and 
minimum values of the wage differential are -0.315 for Extremadura and -0.071 for The Rioja, with 
a standard deviation of 0.071). Regional differences are even higher in the case of male workers, 
where in some regions like Cantabria, Aragon, or Navarra the average wage of part-time workers is 
higher than that of full-time workers (the extreme values of the differential are -0.299 for Madrid 
and -0,050 for Cantabria, with a standard deviation of 0.100). 
Tables A.1 and A.2 of the appendix present descriptive statistics of the sample used in the 
empirical analysis, distinguishing between male and female workers and by the different quartiles of 
the wage distribution. According to these figures, there are significant differences in the 
characteristics of full-time and part-time workers, although these differences vary between male and 
female workers. In particular, in the case of female workers those working part-time present 
characteristics usually associated with lower wages: lower average educational levels and seniority; 
greater incidence of fixed-term contracts; less presence in high-wage sectors like manufacturing and 
construction; and higher presence in small firms without specific collective agreements. In the case 
of male part-time workers, although some characteristics are clearly unfavourable (e.g., lower 
seniority; a greater incidence of fixed-term contracts; work in the service sector and in firms without 
specific collective agreements), other characteristics have the opposite effect (e.g., older and 
seniority). This last circumstance is mainly explained by the characteristics of the individuals in the 
high part of the wage distribution, as better endowments of those variables are, in fact, only 
observed for part-time workers in the right tail of the distribution. This finding is consistent with 
the fact that most job contracts among part-time male workers are related to partial retirement 
(Muñoz de Bustillo et al., 2008). 
 
5.2. National results  
The results of applying the extension of the Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1991, 1993) 
methodology for the decomposition of the differentials in average wages between part-time and 
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full-time workers are shown in Table 4, distinguishing between males (left panel) and females (right 
panel). In particular, the first row of the table shows the value of the raw differential in log hourly 
wages between the two groups of workers, while the rest of the rows show the value of the different 
terms of the decomposition (where a negative value indicates that the factor has a negative effect on 
the wage of part-time workers when compared to full-time workers). For each case, we consider 
three specifications of the wage equation. The first specification (model 1) only includes explanatory 
variables related to the socio-demographic characteristics of the individuals (nationality, education, 
and age). The second specification (model 2) includes the same individual characteristics, but also 
characteristics related to job and firm (e.g., seniority, type of contract, region, sector, size, and type 
of collective agreement). The last specification (model 3) includes firm fixed effects instead of firm 
characteristics. It is important to highlight that the results of models 1 and 2 are equivalent to those 
that would be obtained from a standard decomposition in two components (characteristics and 
returns), such as the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, whereas results from model 3 also include the 
third component of the right side of the equation (3).  
The results of model 1 reveal that when only individual characteristics are considered, the 
lower wage levels of part-time workers are not fully explained by their relative endowments of 
characteristics, but by a different wage treatment. In the case of male workers, the component 
associated with characteristics takes a practically negligible value (a result explained by the fact that 
the lower endowments of education and the greater presence of immigrants between part-time 
workers compensate for the higher average age of this group compared to full-time workers), while 
most of the wage differential corresponds to the unexplained part. In the case of female workers, 
observable characteristics explain a relevant part of the differential (around 41%) (mostly related to 
the lower relative educational endowments of part-time female workers), but as before, most of the 
differential is related to the unexplained part. This implies that the part-time wage-penalty is -10.6 
logarithmic points for male and -15.0 points for female workers. 
The inclusion of additional explanatory variables related to the characteristics of jobs and 
firms (model 2) substantially increases the contribution of the explained component for both 
genders. In the case of male workers, apart from individual characteristics related to lower 
educational levels and seniority, a higher incidence of fixed-term contracts and a higher presence in 
low-wage sectors are the main variables responsible of the wage disadvantage of part-time workers. 
The only factor with a positive effect for this group is their higher relative age. For female workers, 
the factors explaining lower wages of part-time workers are also related to their lower endowments 
of education and seniority and their higher presence in low-wage sectors, although the contribution 
of these variables is relatively lower than in the case of male workers. Hence, the most remarkable 
result of the evidence obtained from model 2 is that, once not only socio-demographic but also job 
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and workplace characteristics are controlled for, a very important part of the wage gap between 
part-time and full-time workers is explained—the contribution of the explained part of the 
differential increases to 66% for men and to 82% for women. The unexplained part (or wage 
penalty in strict sense) is only -3.6 logarithmic points for men and -4.6 logarithmic points for 
women, representing 34% and 18% of the total, respectively. These values are very different from 
the wage premium for part-time workers found by Cebrián et al. (2000), Pissarides et al. (2005), and 
Pagán (2007) using the PHOGUE, but are very close to the results obtained by O'Dorchai et al. 
(2007) with the Structure of Earnings Survey 1995 for men (-6 logarithmic points), and slightly lower 
than those obtained by Fernández-Kranz and Rodríguez-Planas (2011) and Fernández-Kranz et al. 
(2014) using the MCVL (between -6 and -13 logarithmic points). 
The relevance of characteristics as the main explanatory factor of the wage differential 
between part-time and full-time workers is also observed when firm level variables are replaced by 
firm fixed-effects (model 3). According to the obtained results, for both genders the wage 
disadvantage of part-time workers is almost fully explained by their characteristics. The first term of 
the decomposition associated with individual and job characteristics explains 29% of the gap for 
men and 41% for women, and the second term, associated with their relative segregation in low-
wage firms, explains 69% of the gap for men and 56% for women. As a consequence, the third 
component associated with the wage residuals has a minimum influence to explain the gap: it nearly 
disappears for male workers and reduces to -0.7 logarithmic points for female workers. This last 
result shows that, in aggregate terms, part-time workers who possess the same productive 
characteristics as full-time workers and who work in the same firm receive similar wage treatment 
(i.e., there is no evidence of wage discrimination). 
Figures 2 and 3 show the results of the decomposition of wage differences between part-
time and full-time workers by quantiles obtained after applying the methodology proposed by 
Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo (2011). To facilitate the presentation, figure 2 distinguishes between the 
aggregated contribution of characteristics and returns (or wage penalty), whereas figure 3 shows the 
detailed results of the separate effect of each explanatory variable associated with the characteristics 
component7. This evidence has been obtained from a specification of the wage equation that 
includes socio-demographic individual characteristics and job and firm characteristics (model 2). In 
figure 3, variables have been grouped according to these three categories to facilitate interpretation. 
In the case of male workers, and similar to the results obtained for the decomposition of 
average wages, the wage penalty associated with part-time jobs observed in the left and in the 
medium part of the distribution is related to the worst endowment of characteristics of individuals 
                                                 
7 Additional information on the results of the decomposition can be found in tables A.3 and A.4 of the annex. Estimated 
coefficients by means of unconditional quantile regressions required for the decomposition are available from the authors on 
request. 
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with part-time contracts (characteristics), but also to a relative wage penalty (coefficients). However, 
the wage differential decreases along the wage distribution until the point that in the right tail it is 
favourable to part-time workers. The component associated with characteristics shows a slowly 
increasing profile along the distribution, so that for upper quantiles it contributes less negatively to 
the observed wage gap (figure 2)—a result that is explained by the higher incidence of permanent 
contracts in the right tail of the wage distribution (figure 3 and table A.4). In any case, the reduction 
of the wage gap along the wage distribution is mainly explained by the fact that the wage penalty 
reduces its intensity in the right tail of the distribution until a point where it becomes a wage 
premium for the last two deciles (figure 2).  
In the case of women, the results in figure 2 confirm that differences in endowments of 
characteristics are systematically the main driver of the lower wages of part-time female workers 
(figure 2). The influence of this factor is not, however, homogenous along the wage distribution, as 
it is comparatively more reduced in the left tail but growing (in absolute terms) along the 
distribution. The results of the detailed decomposition reveal that the increasing profile of this 
component is due to the increasing importance of the individual characteristics and, in particular, of 
the endowments of education, since the differences in this particular domain are very important and 
negative for workers in the right tail of the distribution (figure 3 and table A.4). The contribution of 
the component associated with coefficients also shows an increasing trend along the wage 
distribution, which means that women in the right part of the distribution, who have more 
experience, higher levels of education, and higher levels of seniority (table A.4 of the annex) suffer a 
greater wage penalty. In particular, this reflects lower returns to education and to experience 
(proxied by age)—a circumstance derived from the three phenomena highlighted in the literature. 
On one hand, part-time workers receive a lower reward to their experience due to the fact that in 
working fewer hours they accumulate less human capital. On the other hand, the returns to 
education are lower as the transition from full-time to part-time work usually involves occupational 
downgrading (Connolly and Gregory, 2009), particularly in those countries, like Spain, where the 
law does not contemplate the right of the employee to reduce working time and keep the same job8. 
Finally, those who work part-time have a lower probability of being promoted in the firm (Russo 
and Hassik, 2008) and show less wage progress when they achieve it (Wolf, 2014 and Fernández-
                                                 
8 In countries like Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, or France the worker can change to part-time status 
with neither loss of category nor responsibility, except in determinate circumstances, which minimises the risk of 
occupational downgrading. In the UK, where this possibility does not exist, Connolly and Gregory (2009) have found 
that 25.6% of the women that opt by part-time jobs suffer occupational downgrading, representing an hourly wage 
decrease of 32%.  
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Kranz and Rodríguez-Planas, 2011). Probably, these three factors affect, in greater measure, those 
who have more studies (more degradation) and more years of experience (more lost promotions)9. 
 
5.3. Regional results 
Tables 5 and 6 show the results of the Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1991, 1993) 
decomposition of average wages between part-time and full-time workers for each of the 17 Spanish 
regions. The obtained results show marked differences between regions, particularly for male 
workers. In the case of female workers, differences in endowments of characteristics (component 
(1) of the decomposition) are systematically unfavourable for part-time workers in all considered 
regions. Differences in observable characteristics are the main reason for the negative wage gap for 
part-time female workers. A similar picture is obtained when looking at the effect of the relative 
distribution of workers among firms (component (2)). While it is true that in most regions the 
greater part of the observed wage gap is explained by different endowments of individual and firm 
characteristics, there are some regions where the unexplained part of the differential (component 
(3)) is particularly relevant. In fact, while in most regions this component is negative (wage penalty), 
there is a significant number of regions where this component is positive (wage premium). As 
previously explained, regional differences in the relative contribution of observed characteristics are 
more complicit in the case of the men, as for this group there are regions where the first component 
can exert a positive or negative effect—a result that reveals that in some regions part-time workers 
have better endowments of productive characteristics. 
Map 1 shows regional differences in the relative contribution of wage residuals (component 
(3)). In the case of men, the wage penalty for part-time workers is higher in the southern part of the 
country (plus The Rioja, Catalonia, and Balearic islands), whereas positive premiums are observed in 
the northern part of Spain, especially in the Basque Country and Navarra, which are regions of high 
per capita income, and Galicia, a region with a specific productive structure. In the case of women, 
higher penalties are observed in the richer regions (Madrid, Catalonia, Basque Country, and the 
Balearic islands) plus Cantabria, whereas small positive premiums are observed in medium-income 
regions (Navarra, Aragon, Canary Islands, and Galicia). These results show that apart from regional 
differences in the characteristics of individuals (like educational level or the age) or of firms (like size 
or sectoral structure), there are other regional factors determining returns to these characteristics for 
different groups of workers. 
                                                 
9 Unlike female workers, these phenomena are not observed for male workers. In fact, the returns to experience do not 
have the same negative impact for males. The most reasonable explanation is that in a lot of cases these workers change 
to part-time jobs after several years of full-time dedication, having accumulated specific human capital at the same level 
as other full-time workers. Men’s returns to education do not have the same penalty as for women, reflecting the 
absence of occupational downgrading although working part-time—a result that is in line with the fact that there is a 
significant proportion of advanced age men who access a partial retirement, probably without changing firms or 
occupations. 
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The literature has pointed out different factors that can explain the existence of a wage 
penalty (or premium) for part-time workers. First, as previously mentioned, the literature tends to 
consider part-time workers as part of the secondary labour market (outsiders), who are mostly 
temporary with reduced job stability10. This implies that the wages of part-time workers are more 
sensitive to the business cycle when compared to full-time workers (insiders). Thus, we will expect 
wage penalty increases associated with part-time work in high unemployment periods accompanied 
by positive shifts of labour supply. Figure 4 relates the unexplained component of the wage 
decomposition for male workers in the different regions with the male unemployment rate, while 
for female workers the comparison is carried out in terms of activity rates11. As can be seen in this 
figure, there is a negative correlation between the considered variables; that is to say, in regions with 
higher values of the unemployment rate, there is a higher wage penalty, whereas in regions with 
lower unemployment rates (males) and low activity rates (females), there is a wage premium for 
part-time workers. These results confirm that in regions with a higher availability of workers (higher 
activity and/or higher unemployment), firms have more power to push down the wages of workers 
in the secondary market, penalising more those in the segment with lower bargaining power. 
Second, the literature has also highlights the role of institutions in explaining wage 
differentials between different types of workers. One of these institutional features is related to the 
presence of unions with capacity to prevent discriminatory practices among firms, making relevant 
the degree of unionisation of part-time workers compared to full-time workers (Riley, 1997). 
Although in the Spanish case the degree of union membership does not determine the bargaining 
power of firms12, one should expect that a higher union density in a particular region would result in 
a higher capacity to defend the rights of the workers and combat social inequalities, including wages. 
Accordingly, regions with higher union density are expected to have a lower wage penalty for part-
time workers. This is precisely what we observe in the figure: a positive correlation both for men 
and women13. Another way of proxying union strength is by means of the relative importance of 
firm-level collective agreements in the region. Such agreements imply a greater presence of unions 
in firms and a lower wage penalty and, this is exactly the result observed both for men and women14. 
A third explanatory factor pointed out in the literature is the monopsonistic power of firms 
due to the limited geographic mobility of part-time workers—an aspect particularly relevant for 
                                                 
10 Tilly (1996) applies this approach to the labour market of part-time workers, and O'Connell and Gash (2003) provide 
evidence for Ireland in this regard. 
11 Data on activity and unemployment rates by gender and region have been obtained from the Spanish Labour Force 
Survey and correspond to the average value in 2010. 
12 As in the considered period, sectorial collective agreements are of legal application “erga omnes” (i.e., to all workers 
and firms). This is automatically translated into a high coverage of agreements, independent of union membership. 
13 Data on union density by region have been obtained from the 2010 Survey of Quality of Life at Work. 
14 The data on the percentage of workers affected by firm collective agreements by region comes from the Statistics of 
Collective Agreements of Work of the Ministry of Employment and Social Security. 
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female workers, as they are much more restricted than male workers in terms of job search. In 
particular, as Ermisch and Wright (1991) show, geographic mobility is much more intense for the 
head of the household, usually males. Due to their lack of mobility and limited job search capacity, 
firms face a relatively inelastic labour supply that makes it possible for them to reduce wages. The 
limitations of the SES regarding the territorial level of detail does not make it possible to consider 
the possible impact in terms of wage penalty of the job search capacity of the unemployed at the 
local labour market level. For this reason, we have tried to proxy this phenomenon by focusing on 
inter-regional mobility. In particular, we expect that the higher the number of workers entering a 
region in the last years, the higher the number of potentially part-time workers who are 
geographically limited15. As seen in the figure, the correlation is negative16, and the effect is the 
expected one: a greater availability of part-time workers in the region reduces their bargaining power 
and increases the wage penalty. 
The evidence presented reveals that regional differences in the wage penalty associated with 
part-time workers when compared to full-time workers is related to a higher sensitivity to labour 
market conditions (unemployment, labour supply, monopsonistic power of firms) and to the 
uneven capacity of unions to prevent such discrimination. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This research has examined wage differentials between part-time and full-time workers in 
Spain using individual data from the Structure of Earnings Survey and econometric decomposition 
methods. The empirical analysis has been carried out distinguishing between male and female 
workers, and it contributes to the literature by considering differences along the wage distribution as 
well as introducing a regional perspective into the analysis. The obtained results allow us to 
conclude that part-time workers in Spain experience a significant wage disadvantage, and that 
disadvantage is higher for female workers. This disadvantage is not homogenous along the wage 
distribution, as in the case of women it tends to increase along the distribution, whereas in the case 
of the men it shows a declining profile until the point at which it ascertains a wage advantage in the 
right tail of the distribution. 
The results of the econometric decompositions show that the wage penalty associated with 
part-time workers, both male and female, is almost fully explained by their relative characteristics 
and, in particular, by segregation of part-time workers in low-wage firms. In fact, we do not observe 
significant wage differences between full-time and part-time workers with similar observable 
                                                 
15 The percentage of workers arriving to the region between 3 and 5 years before in 2010 has been obtained from the 
Statistics of Labour and Geographic Mobility, elaborated by the National Institute of Statistics. 
16 Although in theory a negative correlation for female workers is predicted, the effect is better observed for male 
workers. 
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productive characteristics working in the same firm. However, the wage penalty associated with 
part-time workers differs substantially along the wage distribution, declining for women and 
increasing for men. This seems to indicate that comparatively, part-time work penalises low-
qualified men and high-qualified women the most. 
From a regional perspective, although in the majority of the Spanish regions the greater part 
of the observed average wage differential between part-time and full-time workers tends to be 
explained by endowments of characteristics, there are several regions where the unexplained part of 
the differential is significant, particularly in the case of male workers. Overall, regional differences 
seem to be related to differences in the market power of firms in the regional markets. In fact, a 
lower wage penalty is observed in those regions with lower unemployment rates, lower activity rates, 
and lower immigrant flows in the last few years, as well as a greater presence of unions that can 
bargain and prevent firm discriminatory practices. 
To conclude, our analysis could suffer from a limitation related to the database used in the 
study. It is impossible to take into account the potential selection bias associated with the selection 
of working part-time or full-time by individuals. The usual form to correct this problem requires the 
use of valid exclusion restrictions, which is not possible using the SES. However, as most part-time 
employment in Spain is involuntary, the mentioned limitation could be less important in the Spanish 
context. 
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Figures, maps and tables 
 
Figure 1. 
Wage differentials between part- and full-time workers along the wage distribution. 
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Figure 2. 
Aggregate decomposition of wage differentials between part- and full-time employees. Fortin-Lemieux-
Firpo decomposition. Males (upper panel) and females (lower panel). 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Individual characteristics and job and firm attributes have been considered as explanatory variables. 
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Figure 3. 
Detailed decomposition of wage differentials between part- and full-time employees. Fortin-Lemieux-
Firpo decomposition. Males (upper panel) and females (lower panel). 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Individual characteristics and job and firm attributes have been considered as explanatory variables. 
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Figure 4. 
Unexplained component of wage differentials between part-time and full-time workers and regional 
characteristics by gender. 
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Map 1. 
Regional differences in the unexplained component of wage differentials 
between part-time and full-time workers 
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Table 1. 
Recent studies about part-time versus full-time wage differences 
Authors  Country  Years  Databases  Samples/Gender  Sample/Age Part-time wage 
penalty 
Control 
occupations  
Control self-selection Firm Fixed 
Effects  
O’Connell and Gash 
(2003) 
Ireland 1994 ECHP Men and Women  17 and more M    0% 
W  -9% * 
M   0% 
W  0% 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Hu and Tijdens (2003) Netherland and  
Unites Kingdom 
1984-88 ECHP Men +Women 
together 
15-65 Neth.   -11%* 
UK     -3%* 
Yes Ordered Probit  No 
Rodgers (2004) Australia 2001 HILDA 
(households) 
Men and Women ... M    -3 p. log. 
W   -9 p. log. 
Yes Multinomial Logit No 
Hirsch (2005) USA 1995-2002 Census 
Population 
Survey 
Men and Women  16 and more M   -33 p. log.* 
W  -18 p. log.* 
M   -22 p. log.* 
W  -10 p. log.* 
M  +19 p. log.* 
W +15 p. log.* 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
FE individual 
FE individual 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Jepsen et al (2005) Belgium 1995 SES (firms) Women ...    -4 p. log.* 
  +1 p. log. 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Pissarides et al (2005) United Kingdom 
Finland 
Denmark 
Germany  
Netherland 
Belgium 
Austria 
Ireland 
France 
Italy 
Spain 
Portugal 
Greece 
1994-99 ECHP Men and Women  16-61 UK M -20 p. log.* 
      W -12 p. log.* 
FINL M -9 p. log.* 
         W  -2p. log. 
DEN M -15 p. log.* 
          W-6 p. log.* 
GERM  M 0p. log. 
            W -10 p. log.* 
NET  M -11 p. log.* 
          W  -4 p. log.* 
BELG  M -6 p. log. 
            W  +3 p. log. 
AUS  M -12 p. log.* 
          W  +6 p. log.* 
IREL  M -12 p. log.* 
         W-8 p. log.* 
FRA   M 0 p. log. 
          W  +4 p. log.* 
ITAL M +15 p. log.* 
          W +16 p. log.* 
SPA  M +6 p. log.* 
         W +19 p. log.* 
PORT M 0 p. log. 
           W -4 p. log.* 
GRE M +12 p. log.* 
          W +14 p. log.* 
Yes No (1) No 
Hardoy and Schone 
(2006) 
Norway 1997-98 LLS (households) Women (only 
voluntary PT) 
20-60     - 0,5% 
   -10,9%* 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Probit 
No 
No 
O’Dorchai et al (2007) Belgium 
Denmark 
Italy 
Spain 
Ireland 
United Kingdom 
1995 SES (firms) Men ... BEL    -7 p. log.* 
DEN   +1 p. log. 
ITA   -13 p. log.* 
SPA    -6 p. log.* 
IREL    -29 p. log.* 
U K   -15 p. log.* 
Yes No No 
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Posel and Muller (2007) South Africa 2001-2004 LFS (households) Men ...   + 34% * 
  + 40% * 
  + 50% * 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Individual FE 
No 
No 
No 
Pagán (2007) Spain  2000 ECHP Men and Women  16-64 M  +6 p. log.* 
W +14 p. log.* 
Yes Ordered Probit  No 
Russo and Massik (2008) Netherland  1997-98 
and 1999-
2000 
WCS (firms) Men and Women 
wich do not 
change company 
... M    - 3%* 
W   - 1% * 
Yesi No No 
Manning and Petrongolo 
(2008) 
United Kingdom 2001-03 LFS (households) Women  16-64   -11 p. log.* 
  - 3 p. log.* 
 -11 p. log.* 
 - 2 p. log. * 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Probit 
Probit 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Mumford and Smith 
(2008) 
United Kingdom 2004 BWERS (firms) Men and Women ... M      0 p. log. 
W  -11 p. log.* 
M    +5 p. log.* 
W    -3 p. log.* 
M     +1 p. log.* 
W    -8 p. log.* 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Bardasi and Gornick 
(2008) 
Canada 
USA 
United Kingdom 
Germany  
Italy 
Sweden 
1994-1995 Luxembourg 
Income Study 
Women 25-59 CAN    -9 p. log.* 
USA   -17 p. log.* 
UK       -1 p. log. 
GER    -8 p. log.* 
ITA    -15 p. log.* 
SWE    -3 p. log.* 
Yes Yes No 
Boot and Wood (2008) Australia 2001-04 HILDA 
(households) 
Men and Women 18-60 M Casual    +10%* 
M No Cas  +15%* 
W Casual  + 15%* 
W No Cas + 10%* 
Yes Individual FE No 
Connelly and Gregory 
(2009) 
United Kingdom 1975-2001 New Earnings 
Survey 
Women  16 and more    -10 p. log.* 
    -2 p. log.* 
    -7 p. log.* 
  -32 p. log.* 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
EF Individual FE 
EF Individual FE 
Movers FE 
Movers FE 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Fernández-Kranz and 
Rodríguez-Planas (2011) 
Spain  1996-2006 MCVL Women 25-45   -19 p. log.* 
  -17 p. log.* 
  -13 p. log.* 
   -11 p. log.* 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Individual FE 
Individual FE 
Individual FE 
Individual FE 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Fernández-Kranz, Paul 
and Rodríguez-Planas 
(2014) 
Spain  1996-2006 MCVL Women  23-45 Permanent Contract  
     -6 p. log.* 
Temporary Contract 
      -9 p. log.* 
No (2) Multiequational Model 
and Probit 
Yes 
Wolf (2014) Germany  
(East and West) 
1984-2010 SOEP 
(households) 
Men and Women  20-60 West M -12%* 
         M -11%* 
         W 0% 
         W +1% 
East  M  -11%* 
          M  -10%* 
          W +1% 
          W +2% 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Individual FE No 
Preston and Yu (2015) Australia 2010 AWS 
(households) 
Men and Women ...   M  -8,9 p.log* 
  W  -1,1 p. log* 
W  Casual +7,1%* 
Yes No No 
* Statistically significant at the usual levels (1% or 5%, depending on each paper). 
(1) According to the authors, results are robust to controlling for self selection by a probit model or by individual fixed effect when they work with the sample of movers from full-time to part-time. 
(2) Authors explain that they introduced additional controls (occupations and more) and results did not change. 
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Table 2. 
Wage differentials between part- and full-time workers in Spain. 
 Males Females 
Average -0.104 -0.254 
Percentiles   
5 -0.191 -0.099 
10 -0.178 -0.112 
20 -0.160 -0.137 
30 -0.165 -0.176 
40 -0.159 -0.219 
50 -0.155 -0.266 
60 -0.125 -0.319 
70 -0.099 -0.358 
80 -0.080 -0.388 
90 -0.016 -0.391 
95  0.084 -0.375 
Notes: The wage gap corresponds to the differential of the logarithm of the 
hourly wage. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.   
Incidence of part-time work and wage differences between part-time and full-time workers  
in Spanish regions. 
 
Incidence of  
part-time work 
Wage differential 
part-time/full-time 
 Males Females Males Females 
Andalusia 0.089 0.296 -0.164 -0.305 
Aragon 0.063 0.261  0.028 -0.146 
Asturias 0.054 0.213  0.028 -0.165 
Balearic Islands 0.071 0.220 -0.010 -0.192 
Canary Islands 0.111 0.231 -0.139 -0.268 
Cantabria 0.058 0.233  0.050 -0.230 
Castilla-Leon 0.061 0.252 -0.016 -0.246 
Castilla La Mancha 0.064 0.279 -0.032 -0.269 
Catalonia 0.079 0.235 -0.151 -0.247 
Valencia 0.099 0.306 -0.138 -0.209 
Extremadura 0.069 0.273 -0.104 -0.315 
Galicia 0.067 0.226  0.045 -0.192 
Madrid 0.073 0.208 -0.299 -0.314 
Murcia 0.090 0.286 -0.125 -0.271 
Navarre 0.063 0.314  0.049 -0.071 
Basque Country 0.058 0.306  0.037 -0.227 
The Rioja 0.068 0.290 -0.083 -0.100 
Unweighted average 0.073 0.261 -0.060     -0.222 
Regional standard deviation 0.016 0.036   0.100 0.071 
Maximum 0.111 0.314   0.050     -0.071 
Minimum 0.054 0.208 -0.299     -0.315 
Notes: The wage gap corresponds to the differential of the logarithm of the hourly wage. 
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 Table 4.  
Decomposition of the differential in average wages between part- and full-time workers. 
Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition. 
 Males Females 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Wage differential  -0.104 -0.104  -0.104 -0.254 -0.254 -0.254 
Characteristics (1) 0.002(-2.0) -0.069(66.3) -0.030(28.8) -0.104(40.9) -0.208(81.9) -0.104(40.9) 
Nationality -0.003  -0.001  0.000 -0.002  0.000  0.000 
Educational attainment -0.026 -0.022 -0.017 -0.104 -0.088 -0.069 
Age  0.031  0.014  0.011  0.001  0.000  0.000 
Tenure - -0.016 -0.014 - -0.048 -0.034 
Type of contract - -0.016 -0.010 -  0.000 -0.001 
Region   0.007   -0.005  
Activity sector - -0.040 - - -0.052 - 
Firm size -  0.003 - - -0.006 - 
Collective agreement -  0.003 - - -0.010 - 
Firm fixed effects (2) - - -0.074(69.2) - - -0.143(56.3) 
Wage residuals (3) -0.106(102.0) -0.036(34.6) 0.000(0.0) -0.150(59.1) -0.046(18.1) -0.007(2.8) 
Notes: The table shows the results obtained after applying equation (3) to the 2010 wave of the Encuesta de Estructura Salarial. Model 1 corresponds to a 
specification of the wage equation that includes individual characteristics (nationality, age and education); model 2 incorporates to the specification 
attributes of jobs and firms (tenure, type of contract, region, sector, size and type of collective agreement), whereas model 3 includes individual and job 
attributes and firm fixed effects instead of firm attributes. The percentage of the wage differential explained by each term appears in brackets. 
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 Table 5.  
Decomposition of the differential in average wages between part- and full-time workers. 
Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition. Regional disaggregated analysis. Males. 
 Andal. Arag. Astur. Balear. Canar. Cantab. C-L C-LM Catal. Val. Extre. Galic. Madrid Murcia Navarra Basq. Rioja 
Wage differential  -0.164 0.028 0.028 -0.010 -0.139 0.050 -0.016 -0.032 -0.151 -0.138 -0.104 0.045 -0.299 -0.125 0.049 0.037 -0.083 
Characteristics (1) -0.042 0.075 0.028 -0.015 -0.040 0.059 0.013 0.017 -0.068 -0.019 -0.021 -0.002 -0.121 -0.023 0.017 0.015 -0.004 
Nationality 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 
Educational attainment -0.007 0.002 -0.036 -0.024 0.007 -0.005 -0.001 -0.012 -0.008 0.002 0.004 -0.013 -0.060 -0.016 -0.013 -0.031 0.004 
Age -0.001 0.035 0.041 0.018 -0.007 0.047 0.018 0.016 -0.004 0.010 0.002 0.015 -0.003 0.006 0.024 0.050 0.008 
Tenure -0.020 0.038 0.011 -0.009 -0.032 0.042 0.006 0.014 -0.039 -0.032 -0.019 0.021 -0.035 -0.013 0.036 -0.002 -0.005 
Type of contract -0.013 0.000 0.012 0.000 -0.008 -0.025 -0.010 0.000 -0.016 0.002 -0.007 -0.025 -0.021 0.000 -0.030 -0.003 -0.010 
Firm fixed effects (2) -0.122 -0.056 -0.024 0.003 -0.111 -0.035 -0.042 -0.026 -0.087 -0.113 -0.074 0.004 -0.142 -0.105 -0.034 -0.007 -0.057 
Wage residuals (3) 0.000 0.009 0.025 0.003 0.012 0.025 0.012 -0.023 0.004 -0.006 -0.004 0.043 -0.037 0.003 0.066 0.029 -0.023 
Notes: The table shows the results obtained after applying equation (3) to the 2010 wave of the Encuesta de Estructura Salarial with a specification of the wage equation that includes individual and job characteristics and firm fixed effects. 
 
 
 
Table 6.  
Decomposition of the differential in average wages between part- and full-time workers. 
Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition. Regional disaggregated analysis. Females. 
 Andal. Arag. Astur. Balear. Canar. Cantab. C-L C-LM Catal. Val. Extre. Galic. Madrid Murcia Navarra Basq. Rioja 
Wage differential  -0.305 -0.146 -0.165 -0.192 -0.268 -0.230 -0.246 -0.269 -0.247 -0.209 -0.315 -0.192 -0.314 -0.271 -0.071 -0.227 -0.100 
Characteristics (1) -0.100 -0.085 -0.082 -0.090 -0.089 -0.091 -0.101 -0.108 -0.106 -0.092 -0.105 -0.077 -0.131 -0.100 -0.079 -0.095 -0.082 
Nationality 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
Educational attainment -0.066 -0.055 -0.069 -0.084 -0.063 -0.068 -0.058 -0.089 -0.053 -0.060 -0.075 -0.054 -0.097 -0.070 -0.077 -0.061 -0.047 
Age -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.008 0.003 0.000 
Tenure -0.034 -0.030 -0.020 -0.010 -0.025 -0.021 -0.038 -0.023 -0.046 -0.029 -0.023 -0.021 -0.037 -0.032 -0.011 -0.034 -0.038 
Type of contract 0.002 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.005 0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.007 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.004 0.003 
Firm fixed effects (2) -0.200 -0.088 -0.084 -0.089 -0.198 -0.127 -0.142 -0.159 -0.125 -0.117 -0.203 -0.130 -0.162 -0.166 -0.022 -0.124 -0.018 
Wage residuals (3) -0.005 0.027 0.001 -0.013 0.019 -0.012 -0.002 -0.002 -0.016 0.000 -0.007 0.014 -0.021 -0.006 0.030 -0.008 0.000 
Notes: The table shows the results obtained after applying equation (3) to the 2010 wave of the Encuesta de Estructura Salarial with a specification of the wage equation that includes individual and job characteristics and firm fixed effects. 
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 Appendix 
 
Figure A.1. 
Kernel density functions of the logarithm of hourly wages of part- and full-time males and females. 
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 Table A.1.  
Descriptive statistics. Males. 
 
Full-time Part-time 
 
Total Average Total Average 
 Average S.D. 
Parts of the wage distribution 
Average S.D. 
Parts of the wage distribution 
  <p25 p25-p50 p50-p75 >p75 <p25 p25-p50 p50-p75 >p75 
Logarithm of hourly wage 2.423 0.494 1.874 2.201 2.519 3.097 2.318 0.591 1.709 2.040 2.404 3.121 
Primary education  0.183 0.387 0.278 0.232 0.157 0.067 0.233 0.423 0.259 0.224 0.251 0.198 
Secondary education  0.598 0.490 0.670 0.664 0.621 0.436 0.585 0.493 0.637 0.668 0.555 0.482 
Tertiary education  0.219 0.414 0.052 0.104 0.222 0.497 0.181 0.385 0.104 0.108 0.194 0.320 
Age 40.640 10.150 37.390 39.330 41.010 44.810 42.740 14.830 36.110 37.890 45.030 51.900 
Tenure 9.351 9.676 4.738 7.638 10.530 14.490 9.877 13.410 3.292 4.954 11.870 19.400 
Fixed-term contract 0.811 0.391 0.665 0.781 0.863 0.935 0.444 0.497 0.501 0.548 0.419 0.307 
Andalusia 0.099 0.299 0.103 0.104 0.090 0.101 0.111 0.314 0.134 0.121 0.095 0.095 
Aragon 0.042 0.201 0.035 0.051 0.050 0.034 0.038 0.191 0.028 0.037 0.044 0.042 
Asturias 0.034 0.181 0.034 0.037 0.038 0.026 0.028 0.164 0.025 0.021 0.026 0.038 
Balearics 0.023 0.151 0.030 0.028 0.020 0.016 0.052 0.223 0.044 0.052 0.062 0.051 
Canary Islands 0.042 0.201 0.073 0.037 0.030 0.029 0.033 0.179 0.061 0.027 0.026 0.019 
Cantabria 0.027 0.161 0.033 0.030 0.025 0.019 0.026 0.158 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.032 
Castilla-Leon 0.054 0.227 0.067 0.053 0.052 0.045 0.045 0.208 0.050 0.040 0.041 0.051 
Castilla La Mancha 0.042 0.201 0.055 0.047 0.037 0.029 0.032 0.176 0.029 0.036 0.037 0.026 
Catalonia 0.163 0.369 0.102 0.152 0.190 0.209 0.187 0.390 0.139 0.195 0.216 0.199 
Valencia 0.083 0.275 0.091 0.092 0.081 0.066 0.084 0.278 0.093 0.091 0.100 0.053 
Extremadura 0.024 0.151 0.050 0.020 0.013 0.012 0.017 0.127 0.030 0.019 0.011 0.007 
Galicia 0.055 0.228 0.081 0.065 0.043 0.031 0.040 0.196 0.042 0.045 0.034 0.040 
Madrid 0.171 0.377 0.138 0.138 0.169 0.240 0.172 0.377 0.209 0.181 0.142 0.157 
Murcia 0.031 0.174 0.046 0.036 0.024 0.020 0.026 0.159 0.038 0.027 0.025 0.014 
Navarre 0.030 0.169 0.015 0.033 0.044 0.027 0.029 0.166 0.009 0.026 0.032 0.047 
Basque Country 0.063 0.243 0.027 0.055 0.082 0.089 0.068 0.252 0.034 0.040 0.077 0.124 
The Rioja 0.016 0.125 0.022 0.021 0.014 0.007 0.012 0.109 0.012 0.020 0.010 0.007 
Industry 0.424 0.494 0.354 0.438 0.488 0.415 0.288 0.453 0.161 0.208 0.345 0.437 
Construction 0.122 0.327 0.171 0.154 0.096 0.066 0.037 0.188 0.027 0.047 0.042 0.031 
Services 0.454 0.498 0.475 0.408 0.416 0.518 0.675 0.468 0.812 0.745 0.613 0.532 
Firm size less than 20 0.105 0.307 0.196 0.122 0.060 0.043 0.138 0.345 0.203 0.195 0.103 0.051 
Firm size 10-49 0.238 0.426 0.332 0.287 0.198 0.137 0.195 0.396 0.236 0.228 0.182 0.134 
Firm size 50-199 0.277 0.447 0.261 0.298 0.297 0.250 0.226 0.418 0.214 0.224 0.244 0.221 
Firm size 500 or more 0.380 0.485 0.211 0.293 0.445 0.571 0.441 0.497 0.348 0.353 0.471 0.594 
National sect. collect. agr. 0.286 0.452 0.319 0.282 0.255 0.288 0.282 0.450 0.380 0.312 0.238 0.200 
Sub-national sect. coll. agr. 0.416 0.493 0.527 0.507 0.385 0.243 0.388 0.487 0.362 0.466 0.424 0.302 
Firm collective agreement 0.299 0.458 0.154 0.211 0.360 0.469 0.329 0.470 0.258 0.222 0.338 0.498 
Number of observations 81,578 20,394 20,394 20,394 20,394 7,766 1,941 1,941 1,941 1,941 
Notes: The table includes descriptive (mean and standard deviation) for each of the groups (individuals with full- and part-time) and the value of the average of 
the variables for the four sections of the wage distribution defined by the three quartiles. 
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Table A.2.  
Descriptive statistics. Females. 
 
Full-time Part-time 
 
Total Average Total Average 
 Average S.D. 
Parts of the wage distribution 
Average S.D. 
Parts of the wage distribution 
  <p25 p25-p50 p50-p75 >p75 <p25 p25-p50 p50-p75 >p75 
Logarithm of hourly wage 2.282 0.481 1.736 2.062 2.384 2.945 2.028 0.400 1.623 1.854 2.059 2.576 
Primary education  0.102 0.303 0.191 0.129 0.064 0.024 0.200 0.400 0.261 0.240 0.199 0.101 
Secondary education  0.542 0.498 0.703 0.651 0.539 0.274 0.637 0.481 0.678 0.672 0.669 0.529 
Tertiary education  0.356 0.479 0.105 0.220 0.397 0.701 0.163 0.369 0.061 0.088 0.131 0.370 
Age 39.080 9.826 37.090 37.770 39.360 42.110 39.200 10.920 39.300 39.200 38.900 39.410 
Tenure 8.320 9.059 4.590 6.562 9.498 12.630 5.114 6.623 3.360 4.283 5.315 7.500 
Fixed-term contract 0.800 0.400 0.743 0.777 0.817 0.862 0.666 0.472 0.621 0.668 0.701 0.675 
Andalusia 0.080 0.272 0.077 0.087 0.080 0.078 0.134 0.341 0.166 0.138 0.119 0.113 
Aragon 0.038 0.191 0.038 0.047 0.041 0.025 0.036 0.186 0.027 0.037 0.043 0.037 
Asturias 0.025 0.156 0.043 0.028 0.017 0.013 0.025 0.155 0.038 0.030 0.014 0.016 
Balearics 0.026 0.158 0.025 0.023 0.027 0.027 0.037 0.189 0.029 0.027 0.043 0.050 
Canary Islands 0.044 0.205 0.059 0.045 0.037 0.035 0.040 0.196 0.068 0.035 0.029 0.027 
Cantabria 0.018 0.135 0.023 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.023 0.149 0.017 0.032 0.027 0.015 
Castilla-Leon 0.048 0.213 0.052 0.047 0.046 0.045 0.055 0.228 0.049 0.070 0.054 0.048 
Castilla La Mancha 0.037 0.188 0.044 0.039 0.032 0.032 0.029 0.167 0.034 0.032 0.026 0.024 
Catalonia 0.201 0.401 0.142 0.202 0.231 0.228 0.187 0.390 0.146 0.156 0.218 0.228 
Valencia 0.076 0.265 0.101 0.083 0.070 0.050 0.080 0.271 0.096 0.095 0.064 0.064 
Extremadura 0.016 0.125 0.023 0.011 0.014 0.015 0.020 0.139 0.036 0.015 0.016 0.012 
Galicia 0.059 0.236 0.094 0.061 0.048 0.035 0.047 0.211 0.070 0.052 0.036 0.029 
Madrid 0.223 0.416 0.182 0.192 0.226 0.291 0.170 0.376 0.138 0.187 0.164 0.189 
Murcia 0.026 0.158 0.033 0.024 0.024 0.021 0.027 0.163 0.037 0.027 0.025 0.020 
Navarre 0.020 0.141 0.017 0.027 0.026 0.011 0.020 0.139 0.008 0.016 0.029 0.026 
Basque Country 0.052 0.222 0.029 0.051 0.056 0.072 0.060 0.237 0.029 0.033 0.082 0.094 
The Rioja 0.012 0.108 0.018 0.017 0.008 0.005 0.013 0.111 0.012 0.018 0.011 0.009 
Industry 0.220 0.414 0.231 0.245 0.217 0.185 0.093 0.291 0.095 0.083 0.091 0.105 
Construction 0.014 0.117 0.007 0.016 0.017 0.015 0.005 0.073 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.006 
Services 0.766 0.423 0.762 0.739 0.765 0.800 0.902 0.298 0.903 0.912 0.902 0.889 
Firm size less than 20 0.085 0.280 0.160 0.094 0.057 0.031 0.123 0.329 0.163 0.122 0.115 0.094 
Firm size 10-49 0.171 0.377 0.249 0.202 0.144 0.091 0.153 0.360 0.153 0.153 0.162 0.142 
Firm size 50-199 0.218 0.413 0.243 0.251 0.212 0.168 0.235 0.424 0.250 0.248 0.230 0.212 
Firm size 500 or more 0.525 0.499 0.349 0.453 0.587 0.711 0.489 0.500 0.434 0.477 0.493 0.552 
National sect. collect. agr. 0.349 0.477 0.421 0.353 0.316 0.307 0.304 0.460 0.331 0.299 0.292 0.294 
Sub-national sect. coll. agr. 0.303 0.460 0.388 0.370 0.269 0.186 0.458 0.498 0.433 0.530 0.490 0.380 
Firm collective agreement 0.348 0.476 0.192 0.277 0.415 0.507 0.238 0.426 0.236 0.172 0.217 0.327 
Number of observations 45,338 11,334 11,334 11,334 11,334 17,417 4,354 4,354 4,354 4,354 
Notes: The table includes descriptive (mean and standard deviation) for each of the groups (individuals with full- and part-time) and the value of the average of the 
variables for the four sections of the wage distribution defined by the three quartiles. 
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 Table A.3. 
Decomposition of wage differentials between part- and full-time workers. Fortin-Lemieux-Firpo 
decomposition. Males. 
  Quantiles 
  10th perc.  Median 90th perc.  
Total Part-time 1.692 2.176 3.090 
  (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.019)*** 
 Full-time 1.867 2.345 3.084 
  (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.004)*** 
 Difference -0.176 -0.169 0.006 
  (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.020) 
 Characteristics -0.074 -0.089 -0.053 
  (0.002)*** (0.004)*** (0.009)*** 
 Coefficients -0.102 -0.080 0.059 
  (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.016)*** 
Characteristics Nationality -0.002 -0.003 0.002 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
 Age 0.002 0.008 0.029 
  (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.003)*** 
 Education -0.006 -0.019 -0.042 
  (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.004)*** 
 Tenure -0.018 -0.022 -0.012 
  (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.004)*** 
 Contract -0.025 -0.033 0.011 
  (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.004)*** 
 Region 0.005 0.009 0.008 
  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
 Sector -0.028 -0.032 -0.060 
  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.003)*** 
 Size 0.000 0.001 0.005 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)*** 
 Collective agreement -0.001 0.003 0.005 
  (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
N  89.344 89.344 89.344 
* p<0,1; ** p<0,05; *** p<0,01 
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 Table A.4. 
Decomposition of wage differentials between part- and full-time workers. Fortin-Lemieux-Firpo 
decomposition. Females. 
  Quantiles 
  10th perc.  Median 90th perc.  
Total Part-time 1.616 1.944 2.557 
  (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.009)*** 
 Full-time 1.724 2.216 2.948 
  (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.005)*** 
 Difference -0.107 -0.272 -0.390 
  (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.010)*** 
 Characteristics -0.068 -0.218 -0.297 
  (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.005)*** 
 Coefficients -0.039 -0.054 -0.093 
  (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.009)*** 
Characteristics Nationality -0.001 -0.001 0.003 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
 Age -0.000 0.000 0.001 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
 Education -0.029 -0.091 -0.142 
  (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** 
 Tenure -0.019 -0.056 -0.068 
  (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** 
 Contract -0.003 -0.003 0.005 
  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
 Region -0.001 -0.004 -0.013 
  (0.001)** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
 Sector -0.011 -0.043 -0.063 
  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.003)*** 
 Size -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 
  (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
 Collective agreement 0.001 -0.014 -0.014 
  (0.001) (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
N  62,755 62,755 62,755 
* p<0,1; ** p<0,05; *** p<0,01 
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